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AMADEO v. ZANT
108 S.Ct 1771 (1988)
In an opinion written for an unanimous court by Justice
Marshall, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "evidence supported
district court's factual finding that petitioner established cause
for failure to raise in state trial court constitutional challenge to
composition of juries that had indicted him, convicted him and
sentenced him to death. Reversed and Remanded
FACTS
Tony B. Amadeo was convicted of first degree murder and
criminal attempt to commit theft in the Superior Court of Put-
nam County, Georgia in November, 1977. The jury recom-
mended the death sentence for the murder conviction and a ten-
year sentence for the attempted theft charge, which the court
subsequently imposed.
While the petitioner was pursuing his appeal through the
Georgia Supreme Court an independent civil action was brought
in Federal Court challenging the master jury lists used in Put-
nam County, Georgia. Coincidentally, the attorney representing
the plaintiff in the civil suit was one of Amadeo's attorneys.
The suit was based on new information recently discovered con-
cerning the make up of the jury array used in criminal trials.
CASE HISTORY
In the case of Bailey v. Vining, Civ. Action No. 76-199
MAC (MD Ga., Aug. 17, 1978) a challenge was made to the at-
large voting procedures in Putnam County. While researching
plaintiffs case his attorney, reviewed the master jury lists for a
period of 20-30 years and uncovered a handwritten memoran-
dum from the District Attorney to the Jury Commissioner. In
the memorandum, there was a heading listed as "Result," the
sheet listed figures for the number of black people and women
to be placed on the master jury lists that would result in their
underrepresentation on grand and traverse juries by a range of
5 to 11%. The district court concluded, in Bailey, that the
memorandum was intentionally designed to under represent
these two groups and ordered that the master lists could not be
used for any further purpose until the discrimination had been
corrected to be in compliance with the Constitution.
In petitioner's direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court
he relied on the district court's opinion in Bailey and raised for
the first time a challenge to the composition of the Putnam
County juries that had indicted, convicted and sentenced him.
Petitioner's attorney's filed a supplemental brief which solely
addressed the jury composition issue and further stated Amadeo
had not waived this challenge at the trial level because the in-
formation was not previously discoverable. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences
rejecting his challenge to the jury on the ground that it had
been waived by not raising the challenge earlier. Amadeo v.
State, 243 Ga. 627, 255 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 974,
(1979). Petitioner sought habeas relief through the state courts
without success and was twice denied certiorari by the U. S.
Supreme Court.
After exhausting state remedies, petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The habeas petition
was heard by the same judge who had previously decided the
Bailey case. The court held that the petitioner had been in-
dicted, tried and sentenced by an unconstitutionally composed
jury. The court went on to explain that since the Georgia
Supreme Court had determined that petitioner had waived his
challenge as a matter of state law, petitioner's only forum for
relief would be through the federal habeas petition but he must
establish cause for not raising the issue at trial and that there
was prejudice resulting from the faulty master jury lists. After
reviewing the facts and determining that petitioner's attorney
filed his petition as soon as the information was discovered and
concluding that to overlook the intentional discrimination would
result in a miscarriage of justice, the district court found suffi-
cient cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default and
granted the writ of habeas corpus.
The State of Georgia appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit which remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing. Amadeo v. Kemp, 773 F.2d 1141 (11th Cir. 1985). The
district court judge reaffirmed his earlier conclusion and noted
that the District Attorney had made no attempt to deal honestly
with petitioner's lawyers regarding the jury lists and it was
unreasonable for petitioner's attorney to challenge the list at the
proper time during trial. Again, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
Amadeo v. Kemp, 816 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1987). The court
stated that the jury master list information was readily available
to petitioner since these lists are a matter of public record. The
court held that petitioner had not made conclusive argument to
challenge the Georgia procedural law and therefore entitled to
no relief from the federal court. The petitioner appealed and
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 108 S. Ct. 257
(1987).
HOLDING
The High Court reviewed the standard of "cause and pre-
judice" adopted in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct.
2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The Sykes Court, however, did
not elaborate upon the actual requirements, rather it left the
issue open to interpretation in further proceedings. The Court
held in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), that "the failure of
counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to
him is one situation in which the [cause] requirement is met."
In a later decision the Court went on to state that "the ex-
istence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn
on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor ex-
ternal to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with
State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986). The district court concluded there was a factual basis
for the petitioner to establish cause for his procedural default.
The District Attorney's memorandum had not been reasonably
discoverable by defense counsel and only through further in-
vestigation was the information eventually obtained. The
memorandum had been concealed by the Putnam County of-
ficials. The burden was on petitioner to prove it was this exter-
nal intervening act of concealment by the Putnam County of-
ficials that had "caused" petitioner's failure to raise this objec-
tion at trial, that it was not a tactical decision. The court of ap-
peals may not reverse district court's conclusion of the evidence
if it is plausible in the light of the record viewed in its entirety,
even though it may be convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently."
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). There was
sufficient evidence in the record, considered in it's entirety, to
support the district court's findings. The court of appeals erred
by holding that petitioner's jury challenge was procedurally bar-
red from federal habeas review. The Supreme Court held that
the decision of the court of appeals be reversed and the case
remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
The standard applied here in Amadeo makes it clear that the
petitioner must prove: 1) the information had been "reasonably
unknown" and 2) some "objective factor" external from the
petitioner "caused" the jury challenge not to be raised at trial.
State procedural rules will be upheld unless the attorney can
prove this information was not available at trial. All issues
available at trial must be raised and preserved for appeal.
It is critically important in a capital defense for the attorney
to check the composition of the jury array before the trial. If
there is a question about the legality of the jury master list and
the attorney fails to identify and preserve the issue for appeal,
it will probably be lost through procedural default. For addi-
tional information regarding the key issues in jury selection see
the article in this edition of the Digest, written by Professor
William Geimer, Capital Jury Selection in Virginia, at page 24.
(Elizabeth P. Murtagh)
SATTERWHITE v. TEXAS
486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d. 284 (1988)
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the capital crime of murdering
Mary Francis Davis during a robbery, but before he was
represented by counsel, he was subjected to a court-ordered ex-
amination by a psychologist to determine his competency to
stand trial, sanity at the time of the offense, and future
dangerousness. Petitioner was not served with either a copy of
the State's motion for the examination or the court's order.
Petitioner was later indicted, counsel was appointed to represent
him and he was arraigned.
The District Attorney, without serving a copy of his motion
on defense counsel, requested a second psychiatric evaluation of
petitioner as to the same matters. Without determining whether
defense counsel had been notified of the State's motion, the
trial court granted the motion and ordered an examination by
the same psychologist and a specified psychiatrist.
After petitioner was tried by a jury and convicted of capital
murder, a separate sentencing procedure was conducted in ac-
cordance with Texas law before the same jury. Another
psychiatrist, Dr. Grigson, (whose letter had appeared in the
court file sometime during trial), appeared as a witness for the
State at the sentencing hearing and testified that, pursuant to
court order, he had examined petitioner and concluded that
petitioner was suffering from a severe antisocial personality
disorder, is extremely dangerous and will commit future acts of
violence. The petitioner was sentenced to death.
On petitioner's appeal of his death sentence, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of Dr.
Grigson's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right,
recognized in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), (a defendant formally charged with a
capital crime has the right to consult with counsel before sub-
mitting to a psychiatric examination designed to determine
future dangerousness). However, the court concluded that the
constitutional violation was subject to harmless error analysis,
and that the error was harmless in this case. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
Whether harmless error analysis applies to violations of the
Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.
The Court held that the harmless error rule applies to the
admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. The placement of
the State's motions and the court's ex parte orders for the
psychiatric testimony in the court file did not satisfy the re-
quirement of notice to the defense counsel that such psychiatric
evaluation of his client's future dangerousness would take place.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the use of Dr.
Grigson's testimony at the capital sentencing proceeding on the
issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that although it has generally held that
if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, the error
is harmless and the verdict may stand, "some constitutional
violations by their very nature cast so much doubt on the
fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can
never be considered harmless. Sixth Amendment violations that
pervade the entire proceeding fall within this category." 108
S.Ct. at 1797. The Court cited many cases including Holloway
